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Ross, J. (in press, 2007). Children’s production and recognition of self-image in 
drawings. In C. Lange-Kuettner & A. Vinter (Eds.). Drawing and Non-Verbal 
Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Drawing production, drawing re-experience and drawing re-cognition 
 
The maxim ‘Children draw what they know, rather than what they see’ is a 
formative and recurring topic in the study of children’s art. This characteristic, 
implying a communicative or expressive function for children’s drawings, has led 
many to reason that early artwork can be used to study cognitive development. Study 
of the psychology of children’s drawings is now in its second century (key works 
include; Ricci, 1887; Kerschensteiner, 1905; Luquet, 1913; Eng, 1931; Harris, 1963; 
Kellogg, 1970; Goodnow, 1977; Freeman, 1980; Cox, 1992; Lange-Küttner and 
Thomas, 1995). A substantial body of work has concerned the expression - or 
‘projection’- of emotions in children’s art (for a summary see Burkitt, Barrett & 
Davis, 2003). The intellectual correlates of drawing ability have also been repeatedly 
examined (Harris, 1963; Bensur, Eliot and Hedge, 1997). However, the bulk of 
literature regarding children’s drawings has focused on the ontogenetic development 
of drawings as graphic representations.  
 
Common to the developmental accounts of drawing advanced by modern 
theorists (Kellog, 1970; Goodnow, 1977; Freeman, 1980; Cox 1992) and their 
predecessors (Kerschensteiner, 1905; Luquet, 1913; Eng 1931) is the proposal that 
children’s drawings develop in a conventional way, building toward the 
representation of perceptual reality. Kerschensteiner (1905) offered the first detailed 
stage theory of drawing based on a massive sample of almost 300, 000 drawings 
produced by school children. The schematic development of drawing was further 
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qualified by Luquet (1913) and Eng (1931) following the longitudinal study of 
individual children. Each of these theorists emphasise the child’s path to attainment of 
conventional drawing skills, advancing graphic expression from an exercise in motor 
skill to a representative product. Later, Kellogg (1970) proposed that young children’s 
drawings begin with pre-representational graphic elements, reflecting a common 
perceptual experience of reality (i.e. geometric shapes), which are gradually modified 
until representational drawings are produced (e.g. circles for heads). Freeman (1980), 
focuses on children’s acquisition of specific techniques used to plan drawing 
performance and overcome misleading perceptual cues (e.g. the representation of 
occluded objects). Similarly, Goodnow (1977) and Cox (1992) give comprehensive 
descriptions of the sequence of veridical errors (e.g. missing or misassembled 
features) and achievements (e.g. the grasp of proportion and perspective) which typify 
children’s drawings at each developmental stage.  
 
As noted, the developmental psychologist’s focus on perceptual reality may be 
motivated by the view that representations of reality express knowledge, i.e. what the 
child knows about the world. However, although considerable consensus has been 
reached regarding the ontogenetic development of objective reality (the outside 
world) in terms of its appearance on paper, qualification of what this appearance 
means in terms of the child’s subjective reality (the inside world) has been less 
explicit. Drawing topics (e.g. family drawings) and devices (e.g. relative size, colour) 
have historically been considered expressive of emotional state (Burkitt, Barret & 
Davis, 2003). However,  less attention has been given to the idea that drawing 
schemes may be expressive of children’s cognition regarding the drawing topic.  
Perhaps the most striking evidence in support of this statement is the observation that 
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only a handful of experiments in the history of children’s drawings research have 
employed children, as opposed to adults, in the evaluation of their own and/or other 
children’s drawings.  
 
An early study consulting children about their drawings was carried out by 
White and Johnson (1930). They reported that children under the age of five were 
more successful in naming the subject matter of drawings produced by their peers 
than interpreting the paintings of masters such as Monet and Picasso. Stacey and Ross 
(1975) later extended this result, demonstrating that young children are capable of 
making cognitive evaluations of drawing ownership.  In this study, five- to seven-
year-old children were asked to recognise their own drawing from a set of twenty 
similar drawings produced by their peers. 73% of the sample were able to recognise a 
drawing that they had produced one week earlier, and 60% were able to recognise a 
drawing produced five weeks before. This rate of success is notably high given the 
high number of matched topic distracter drawings present at the recognition stage.  
 
Nolan, Kagan and colleagues (1980a; 1980b; 1981) ran a series of studies 
which confirm that children are capable of recognising their own products under 
challenging conditions. In their studies, young children were asked to identify four 
drawings that they had made a week earlier of a bird, flower, man and tree. During the 
test phase, each drawing was presented to the child together with three foils produced 
from the original and altered to vary from it in small aspects of size, detail and 
perspective. Despite high levels of similarity between distracter drawings and their 
original product, children as young as four and a half years of age were typically able 
to identify over a third of their own drawings (Nolan, Adams and Kagan, 1980a). 
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Nolan and Kagan (1980b, 1981) reported equivalent success rates for children aged 
between two and a half and three and a half years.  These success rates are marginally 
higher than the quarter of correct identifications predicted by chance. 
 
Interestingly, Nolan and Kagan (1981) found children’s memories for others’ 
drawings to be similarly impressive. When children were asked to recognise peers’ 
drawings which they had been shown, encouraged to label and memorise one week 
earlier, they were again successful on over a third of occasions. However, Nolan and 
Kagan (1981) found no correlation between the recognition tasks for own versus 
others’ drawings. Further, the correlations between recognition success and age, and 
recognition success and cognitive ability (as measured by the 1975 Winett Preschool 
Inventory) that were present for own drawings, were not apparent for performance 
regarding others’ drawings. The authors took this to suggest that recognition of own 
and others’ products may rely on cognitively different processes.  
 
Gross and Hayne (1999) have provided the most recent evidence concerning 
children’s memory for drawings, reporting that children are capable of recalling 
drawing episodes following substantial delays. They asked three- to six-year-old 
children to draw and describe three pictures depicting what happens during a birthday 
party, a trip to the park, and visit to the supermarket. Later, the children were asked to 
recognise their birthday party drawing when placed alongside two similar drawings 
produced by their peers. Using this paradigm, Gross and Hayne (1999, Experiment 
1A) found that 60% of  three- to four-year-olds were able to recognise and correctly 
interpret aspects of their drawing up to three months after drawing production.  Five- 
to six-year old children performed at ceiling in recognising their birthday party 
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drawings up to six months following production.  Moreover, Gross and Hayne (1999, 
Experiment 1B) subsequently demonstrated that the vast majority (90%) of five- to 
six-year-old children were capable of correctly identifying a drawing of a class-outing 
when presented with two similar distracters made one year before.     
 
In an effort to determine the importance of drawing production for later 
recognition, Gross and Hayne (1999, Experiment 2) ran a further experiment 
comparing children’s memory for their own versus a peer’s drawing of an emotional 
event (a time when they were happy, sad, or scared). After making their own drawing, 
children were shown and asked to listen to a description of another child’s drawing. 
To test for recognition, these drawings were presented separately after a delay of three 
months alongside two similar ‘distracter’ drawings. Interestingly, although the 
majority (70%) of three- to six-year-old children were capable of identifying and 
qualifying their peers’ drawing, children were significantly more accurate in 
identifying their own drawings (90% recognition rate).    
 
As implied by the motivation of Gross and Hayne’ s (1999) second 
experiment, the finding that recognition of others’ drawings differs from recognition 
of own drawings is intuitively viable. When asking children to recognise their own 
drawings one is asking them to recognise a self-production. Freeman (1972) notes that 
when producing representative drawings children are required to hold in mind 
conceptual and perceptual components of the chosen topic, and to physically translate 
perceptual parts into coordinated graphic schema. By this account drawing production 
requires cognitive reasoning (in terms of drawing topic, and in terms of the placement 
of constituent parts relative to other drawing features on the page) in addition to visual 
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input and motor coordination. Freeman’s (1972) analysis makes clear that drawing 
production implies a level of self-engagement – both physical and cognitive - 
unparalleled by relatively passive engagement with another’s finished product.  
 
In addition to the high level of self-involvement inherent in producing a 
drawing, it is possible that the finished product is self-reflective in terms of style. Van 
Sommers (1984) offers extensive documentation of idiosyncrasy and conservatism (or 
originality and consistency) in the artwork of young children. The presence of style in 
children’s art work has also been demonstrated empirically; adult judges are 
apparently able to sort sets of drawings provided by children between the ages of 
three and five years according to artist (Hartley et al, 1982; Campbell and Harris, 
unpublished manuscript). Nolan, Adams and Kagan (1980a) note that appreciation of 
style would suggest a well articulated conception of subtle aspects of an artist’s 
products. When applied to one’s own products, this would entail holding a relatively 
high order conceptualisation of the self. In support of this mechanism of recognition 
Nolan and colleagues (1980a, 1980b, 1981) data suggest that young children are 
sensitive to small changes in the way particular topics are represented.   
 
What recognition studies make clear is that drawings are open to claims of 
ownership. Whether claims of ownership are based on recognition of style or on 
memory of the drawing’s creation, they are ultimately based on a link between the 
drawing and the self. For this reason, drawing recognition studies have the potential to 
reveal recursive self-awareness. Moreover, it seems reasonable that certain drawing 
episodes are in themselves capable of revealing aspects of self-awareness. For 
example, the link between drawing production and the self is particularly clear on 
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occasions where the child is both the producer and topic of the drawing. Self-portraits 
may be regarded as advanced forms of the mirror test of self-recognition, involving 
both the recognition of one’s external self and the internal maintenance of that image. 
Although successful graphic representation of the self-image may vary depending on 
motor ability, a necessary requirement for embarking on such a task is a concept of 
the self. This reasoning suggests that certain features of self-drawings - for example, 
levels of differentiation and detail - are likely to reveal the content and/or extent of 
self-knowledge. In support of this argument, there is evidence for a self-referent bias 
in figure drawing. Research suggests that between five and seven years of age 
children consistently include more body features in self-drawings than in drawings of 
other, presumably less familiar, people (Gellert, 1968).   
 
Empirical substantiation of a link between self-drawings, drawing recognition, 
and self-awareness may add weight to the historical assumption that drawings offer a 
route to the child’s conceptual (as opposed to perceptual) reality. Following this 
reasoning, I carried out two studies designed to investigate the impact of the self in 
the production and recognition of drawings. The methodology and results of each 
study are described below. 
 
The impact of the self in the production and recognition of drawings 
 
Study One: Exploring the relationship between self-drawings and self-awareness.   
 
The first study aimed to test the hypothesised link between children’s self-
drawings and their developing self-awareness. Children ranging in age from 3 to 9 
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years produced a self-drawing, and, to allow comparison between representations of 
self and other, a drawing of a same sex peer. Drawings were scored for quality 
according to established guidelines provided by the Goodenough-Harris Drawing test 
manual (Harris, 1963). This manual describes how drawings accumulate credit based 
on levels of feature inclusion, realism and motor skill. To provide empirical support 
for a relationship between the quality of self-representation and self-awareness, two 
additional measures of ‘self-recognition’ were included. Firstly, children were 
required to discriminate their own figure drawings from four distracter figure 
drawings after a delay of two weeks. Secondly, children’s reactions to the 
introduction of a mirror following completion of a verbal task were observed.  Mirror 
self-recognition is currently the only implicit developmental measure of self-
awareness routinely employed (see Bard, this volume). By the age of two children are 
able to recognise their image, as evidenced by their reaching toward a surreptitiously 
introduced head-mark on the introduction of a mirror (Amsterdam, 1972).  However, 
behavioural reactions to the self-reflective properties of the mirror also have the 
potential to elucidate self-awareness later in development.  
 
 An intriguing tool for formalising the antecedents and consequents of self-
reflection is provided by Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory of self-awareness. 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) dichotomise self-awareness according to attentional 
focus. Attentiveness to feedback from the environment is regarded as “subjective” 
self-awareness, whilst attentiveness to one’s self as an object in that environment is 
categorised as “objective” self-awareness (OSA). Objective focus upon the self can be 
induced by stimuli highlighting the self, such as a salient audience or mirror image. 
The major consequence (and evolutionary advantage) of objective self-reflection is 
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thought to be self-evaluation, which leads to appropriate behavioural regulation. 
Dependent on situational factors, Duval and Wicklund (1972) predict that self-
evaluation will usually result in a) behavioural adjustment to become consistent with 
internalised or externalised standards, and/or b) withdrawal from the evaluation-
inducing situation. In this way, cognitive and affective equilibrium regarding the self 
is maintained. Crucially, Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) behavioural predictions can be 
used  to develop implicit measurement of self-awareness beyond that indexed by early 
mirror self-recognition.   
 
  Originally it was assumed that OSA would be a negative state, to be avoided. 
However later work showed that where evaluation of the self meets one’s standards, 
OSA can result in positive affect and may be actively sought (Greenberg and 
Musham, 1981). In the first study, this positive aspect of OSA was used to create a 
situation allowing implicit observation of self-aware behaviour. Children were given 
the opportunity to view themselves in a mirror following a verbal description task 
with an undefined outcome. Immediately before the introduction of the mirror half of 
the children were given high levels of praise, and half offered no feedback. All 
children were then asked to look in the mirror ‘to see how well they had done’. It was 
expected that children given praise would evaluate their performance relatively 
positively, and therefore spend longer looking in the mirror (remaining comfortable in 
a mirror-induced state of OSA) than children who received no positive feedback.  
 
  Although Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory has received continued interest 
and empirical support in the adult literature (see Silvia & Duval, 2001 for a review), 
their methods have rarely been applied in early developmental research. For this 
 10 
reason, a supplementary aim of the first study was to elucidate the age at which 
children behave as though actively self-evaluative. Where mirror behaviour is not 
systematically affected by feedback, it seems reasonable to assume that OSA is 
absent. 
 
 The results of the first study supported a link between self-representation and 
self-knowledge. Consistent with Gellert’s (1968) finding that children are more adept 
at representing themselves graphically than representing others, there was a small, but 
consistent, self-referent bias in figure drawing quality for all age-groups (see Figure 
1). Although the quality of self and other figure drawings were positively correlated at 
0.90,  self-drawings consistently scored more highly than drawings of others on the 
Goodenough-Harris (1963) drawing scale. The observation that young children 
employ qualitatively different drawing schemes to represent themselves versus similar 
others implies that self-drawings are inherently linked to the ability to self-
differentiate.  
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Moreover, the quality scores for self-drawings, but not other-drawings, were 
related to self-aware behaviour as indexed by mirror recognition. Even the youngest 
age-group systematically altered their mirror behaviour as a function of feedback, 
suggesting they held the sophisticated level of self-awareness described in Duval and 
Wicklund’s (1972) model. Figure 2 shows that children of all ages spent significantly 
longer in front of the mirror when given praise. However, the more advanced children 
are developmentally, the less their mirror reactions appear to depend on external 
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feedback. As shown in Figure 2, the magnitude of the effect of the experimenter’s 
praise decreases with age. These findings suggest that evaluation of the self may first 
rely on external input before becoming internalised. For this reason, the observation 
of a child’s dependence on external versus internal sources of self-evaluation may 
provide a relatively fine measure of developing self-awareness.  
 
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Interestingly, the time spent in front of the mirror following praise was 
significantly negatively correlated with self-drawing quality at  -0.4. A possible 
interpretation of this negative relationship is to assume that the waiting times of those 
with a higher level of self-awareness (as reflected  by higher quality self-drawings) 
were tempered by their own opinion. One’s own performance evaluation was likely to 
be less positive than the experimenter’s randomly distributed, over-inflated, praise. As 
a result, spontaneous self-evaluation would likely encourage relatively early 
withdrawal from the OSA inducing situation.  
 
In addition to being related to self-drawing quality and ontogenetic 
development, self-aware mirror behaviours can also be linked to the ability to 
recognise one’s own drawing products. Two thirds of the sample – with 
representatives from all age-groups - successfully identified both of their own 
drawings when viewed with distracters after a delay. When considered as a group, 
these children showed the expected effect of feedback; waiting significantly longer in 
self-reflective conditions following praise. By contrast, the remaining third of the 
sample – those who did not recognise their own products – showed no significant 
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evidence of self-evaluation as measured by systematic responses to experimenter 
feedback.  The finding that those who fail to show self-evaluative behaviour in classic 
OSA inducing conditions also fail to successfully evaluate their own products in terms 
of ownership suggests that the two capabilities may be related.  
 
Study two: Exploring the relationship between drawing ownership and self-
awareness 
 
The first study offered some empirical support for the proposal that own 
drawing recognition is likely to be related to self-awareness. The aim of the second 
study was to further elucidate this association by investigating whether drawing 
recognition not only relates but relies on self-awareness, i.e. constitutes an act of self-
recognition. By increasing sample size and the number of recognition episodes we 
hoped to provide a more thorough assessment of the development of successful 
drawing recognition.  
 
3- to 7-year-old children were asked to discriminate their own drawings 
(including a cup, crocodile, and self-portrait) from five matched-topic distracter 
drawings after delays of up to four weeks. To further assess the impact of self 
involvement on drawing recognition, around a third of the children were also asked to 
identify a peer’s cup, crocodile and self-drawing with which they had previous 
contact. Peers’ drawings cannot be considered equivalent to own drawings in terms of 
planning (choosing how to represent the topic) or implementation (demonstrating 
one’s own drawing style). However, the extent to which one physically engages with 
others’ drawings is easily alterable. To vary this factor children either traced their 
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peer’s drawing with a pencil (active visual and motor input), or viewed the drawing 
while it was described to them (no motor input or visual mark-making). By separating 
the physical and cognitive components of drawing production in this way we hoped to 
compare recognition rates for drawings which had required ascending levels of self-
involvement, and thus involved ascending levels of self-recognition.   
 
We also observed the impact of variations in drawing skill on drawing 
recognition. To provide a global measure of each child’s drawing skill we classified 
self-drawings in reference to Luquet’s (1913) popular account of drawing 
development. Luquet (1913) suggested that children’s drawing development proceeds 
sequentially from non-representational scribbles, to failed or ‘pre-conventional’ 
attempts at realism in which a poorly coordinated selection of the constituent parts of 
the topic is represented, to a schematic and more accurate ‘conventional’ 
representation of the topic. These developmental stages imply cognitive and motor 
advances in representation in terms of the level of realism aimed for and achieved, 
and can be easily distinguished when viewing human figure drawings provided by 
children ranging in age from three to seven years (see Figure 3).  
 
[insert Figure 3 about here]  
 
To provide a finer measure of the impact of drawing quality, drawings of all 
topics were also scored according to a scale inspired by the Goodenough-Harris 
(1963) draw-a-man test manual. Firstly, drawings attracted credit for the number of 
features included, for depicting all basic features of the drawing model, and for 
placing features in the correct place relative to the other features included. Drawings 
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were also credited for motor skill in reference to a component included in the 
Goodenough-Harris (1963) manual specifying firm and well-controlled pencil lines 
(Harris, 1963: 262).  Finally, a global judgement of whether or not the finished 
drawing was clearly representative of the drawing model was made.  As the model 
was no longer present for the case of self-drawings, this post hoc judgement referred 
to the drawings which clearly depicted a human figure with ‘characteristic’ features of 
hairstyle, dress, or other physical appearance. Figure 4 gives examples of high, 
intermediate and low scoring drawings of each topic. Measurement of the level of 
drawing skill exhibited in individual products, and by the artist globally, allowed 
thorough investigation of the proposal that successful representation of a topic may be 
related to its subsequent recognition.  
 
[insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
The results of the second study allow further qualification of the development 
of successful drawing recognition. Given the number of distracter drawings present, 
children had a one in six chance of correctly selecting their own drawing in each 
recognition episode. Averaged over three episodes, this gives a chance hit rate of 1.5 
drawings per individual. Figure 5 shows that although the majority of children 
performed above chance, recognised two or more of the three drawings they had 
provided, only a minority of three- and four-year olds achieved this level of success. 
This effect is in keeping with the age-related improvement in drawing recognition 
observed by Gross and Hayne, 1999.  
 
[insert Figure 5 about here] 
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Figure 6 shows that traced drawings were also likely to be recognised after 
sizeable delays, with the majority of children over the age of 5 years recognising two 
or more of the three drawings they had previously traced. By contrast, recognition 
performance for drawings previously only viewed (shown in Figure 7) was very poor. 
The majority of children recognised one or less of the drawings that they had simply 
seen, and even by the age of 7 only half of the children achieved recognition success.  
 
[insert Figure 6 about here] 
[insert Figure 7 about here] 
  
Direct comparison of recognition rates for drawings encountered in different 
conditions confirms that the drawing recognition is affected by the level of self-
involvement at the production stage (see Figure 8). Children who simply had visual 
contact with others’ drawings were less able to recognise them as successfully as their 
own productions. However, on average, when children traced others’ drawings they 
later recognised them just as successfully as they recognised their own. Further, those 
who traced others’ drawings appeared to have depressed own drawing recognition 
rates relative to those who viewed others’ drawings. This result can be interpreted as 
resulting from interference due to an increase in the number of competing production 
episodes. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
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The finding that recognition rates for tracings and original productions were 
statistically equivalent implies that at this age the conceptual aspects of drawing 
production are less important for recognition than physical aspects. The observed 
effect of personal physical input is reminiscent of a self-referent bias found in verbal 
recall; there is an established mnemonic advantage for action statements that one has 
performed relative to those one has described verbally, imagined, or witnessed being 
performed by another person (Engelkamp and Zimmer, 1997). The implication is that 
the depth of processing involved in physically producing a drawing is enough to 
secure its subsequent recall, or to interfere with recall of other drawings. 
 
The results discussed so far challenge the hypothesis that drawing recognition 
relies on recognition of cognitive input, emphasising instead the physical trace of the 
drawing episode. However, close observation of individual recognition profiles 
revealed that proportionately more children performed at ceiling when recognising 
their own drawings (38%) than when identifying previous tracings (17%). This 
implies that the ‘full’ drawing experience provides optimal conditions for recognition.  
 
Further, analysis of the relationship between drawing quality and recognition 
confirms that representative aspects of the drawing process do impact on recognition, 
showing a correlation of 0.6. There was a significant difference in the number of 
drawings recognised by scribblers, pre-conventional drawers and conventional 
drawers, even when controlling for age. Figure 9 shows that children who drew 
themselves non-representatively - whose mark-making appeared to be purely an 
exercise in motor skill - were never successful in recognising their own products 
above the level expected by chance. Around half of children who drew pre-
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conventionally were successful, while an impressive majority of conventional drawers 
recognised two or more of their own drawings. This result confirmed that the content 
of motor input – which is dictated by cognitive engagement during the drawing 
process – is crucial for subsequent recognition (for further discussion see Riggs, 
Campbell, this volume). 
 
[insert Figure 9 about here] 
  
 The quality scores of individual drawings also had a significant effect on 
drawing recognition, again, even when controlling for age. Those recognising one or 
less drawings had significantly lower quality scores (mean 4.3) than those recognising 
two or three drawings (mean 8.9). Moreover, each individual component of the 
quality scale was strong enough to predict drawing recognition independently of 
overall scores. This result confirms that the more articulated and successfully 
representative the drawing product – as dictated by cognitive-behavioural input -  the 
more likely it is to be recognised.   
 
As may be anticipated, self-drawings were again found to be of consistently 
higher quality than drawings of other topics. The superior quality of self-drawings is 
likely to be in part due to children’s familiarity with the subject matter. Figure 
drawings are a popular topic choice relative to crocodile and cup drawings, meaning 
that a suitable drawing scheme is likely to be readily available. Besides, Study 1 
demonstrated that self-drawings are likely to be advanced even relative to other figure 
drawings. As predicted by the observed relationship between drawing quality and 
recognition, self-drawings were also recognised more frequently than drawings of 
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other topic. Despite the confound between drawing topic and drawing quality, it is 
worth noting that in this study self-drawings had an added advantage at the 
recognition stage.  Distracter ‘self’ drawings were produced by children of the same 
age and sex, however, they ultimately referred to different models. As a result, 
children who successfully represented themselves should have had the opportunity to 
identify their own drawing via recognition of their own likeness.  
 
In anecdotal support of self-image recognition, several of the children in both 
the first and second studies pointed out their own characteristic features in self-
drawings during the recognition process (see Figure 10). Figure 11 shows an accurate 
portrait of the author drawn by a six-year-old child and supports the suggestion that 
young children are capable of capturing likeness in drawings. In empirical support of 
this strategy, there was some evidence to suggest that recognition of self-portraits 
relied on qualitatively different processes. In an interesting reflection of the 
importance of physical self-involvement, linear regression (stepwise) suggested that 
the component motor-coordination: lines – indicating confident mark-making - was 
the single most influential quality factor in drawing recognition for both cup and 
crocodile drawings. For these topics, this factor was more predictive of  recognition 
than the number and accuracy of drawing features included, and the extent to which 
the drawing was successfully representative.  However, for self-portraits being 
credited as successfully representative of the model was the most influential factor for 
later recognition.  
 
 [insert Figure 10 about here] 
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[insert Figure 11 about here] 
 
The impact of the self in the production and recognition of drawings 
 
This research offers clear support for the proposal that drawings can be 
usefully employed to investigate developing self-awareness. In the first study, the 
quality of self-drawings predicted reactions to self-reflexive media. Those who 
produced higher quality graphic self-representations were more likely to index self-
recognition via mirror behaviours. This result supports the hypothesis that self-
drawings are indicative of self-knowledge. Moreover, drawing recognition could also 
be independently linked to self-awareness; those who failed to index self-recognition 
in front of the mirror also failed to recognise their own drawings.  This finding 
supports the proposal that the ability to recognise one’s own drawing products may be 
considered an act of self-recognition.   
 
There was some anecdotal and empirical evidence to suggest that children 
refer to cognitive self-representation not only to produce but also to identify self-
drawings. This suggests that self-drawing recognition may be considered a 
‘specialised’ act of self-recognition. However, the second study, which emphasised 
the importance of drawing production (a self-referent event), confirmed that the link 
between drawing recognition and self-awareness is not limited to recognition of self-
drawings. The level of physical self-involvement in drawing production was shown to 
affect subsequent drawing recognition rates.  Own drawing recognition improved 
considerably with age, and it appeared that this relationship was mediated by 
cognitive-behavioural input at the production stage. Drawings which were better 
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planned and implemented, particularly in terms of topic representation and purposeful 
mark-making, were recognised more frequently.  Most strikingly, children who 
produced unrepresentative drawings – requiring only minimal levels of cognition – 
were unsuccessful in claiming ownership of their own products.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents and supports the argument that children’s drawings have 
the capacity to reflect conceptual knowledge (what children know) in addition to 
perceptual knowledge (what they see).  In particular, it is suggested that the cognitive 
and physical demands of drawing production make all drawing episodes self-referent. 
For this reason, children’s retrospective analysis of their own drawings has the 
potential to reveal their self-awareness. At least in the case of self-drawings, objective 
analysis of drawing content can also be indicative of self-knowledge.   In the past, 
content based analysis of children’s drawings has allowed valuable comment on the 
problem-solving processes involved in representing one’s 3D reality in 2D. However, 
by exploring children’s drawings in a context based manner, drawing recognition 
studies make clear that it should also be possible to make the converse journey; 
inferring children’s 3D reality from their 2D productions. Specifically, by exploring 
graphic self-representation via both self-drawings and retrospective claims of drawing 
ownership, it may be possible to track the problem solving processes involved in 
representing oneself cognitively. 
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